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Can rights be ring-fenced in times of austerity? Equality, equity and judicial 
‘trusteeship’ over the UK’s fairness agenda   
 
Jacinta Miller and Alice Diver 
School of Law/TJI 
Ulster University, Northern Ireland 
 
Abstract 
The need for some form of „fairness agenda‟ has been cited on several 
occasions in connection with the UK‟s ongoing programmes of welfare 
reform.
1
 That the state has an over-arching duty to preserve finite resources, 
whilst also promoting just and „equitable outcomes‟ via its decision-making 
processes, has also been noted in a number of recent cases arising out of the 
introduction of „austerity measures.‟2  Whether equitable concepts are set to 
expand upon basic equality principles in cases involving adequate living 
standards remains to be seen. What does seem fairly clear is that budgetary 
limitations have the potential to impact significantly upon the lives of the most 
vulnerable members of society, particularly in respect of such particularly 
„fragile rights‟ as housing or health care provision. This is especially so where 
such socio-economic rights have tended to require considerable levels of 
financial and political bolstering, in the absence of which they risk being 
forever framed as merely aspirational in nature, suitable only for some gently 
                                                 
1
 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/oct/06/david-cameron-fairness-people-deserve  
(accessed 30.04.15); http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/9000249/David-
Cameron-my-vision-for-a-fair-Britain.html (accessed 10.10.15) 
2
 See for example MA and others v The Secretary Of State For Work And Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 
13; R (D) v Worcestershire County Council  [2013] EWHC 2490 (Admin); R (Hardy) v Sandwell 
Metropolitan Borough Council [2015] EWHC 890 (Admin); R (Rutherford) v SSWP [2014] EWHC 
1631 (Admin) 
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progressive form of realization. Litigation in domestic courts remains key: as 
Harris argued, „non-justiciability may be revealed as the reason for there being 
no legally enforceable rights.‟3 Equally, the notion of a justiciable right to an 
adequate standard of living is perhaps still a little too „malleable,‟ to be 
considered on a „justiciability-par‟ with weightier civil or political rights. 4  
This chapter will argue that a rights-template tied to the notion of „socio-
economic equity‟ (rather than equality) could frame domestic judges as the 
„trustees‟ of public budgets,  and of the socio-economic rights that such funds 
are meant to protect and promote. This could in turn potentially serve to 
challenge at least some of the increasingly profound „cycles of poverty that can 
only be broken through structural reforms.‟5 The role of domestic courts is a 
fundamental, and essentially fiduciary one: judges are best placed to keep 
reminding legislators and policy-makers of the need to identify (and avoid 
dipping below) clearly articulated rights standards which should in themselves 
be firmly grounded upon such key rights concepts as human dignity and 
„bodily integrity.‟6  
 
                                                 
3
 B V Harris „Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy‟ Cambridge Law Journal 
(2003) (62) 631 -660  p 633.  Harris uses the terms „judicial review‟ and „justiciability‟ almost 
interchangeably when he argues that „the courts have struggled to determine whether the exercise of 
the prerogative of mercy is vulnerable to judicial review, that is, whether or not it is justiciable.‟ (p 
636)  
4
 See M Finkelstein, „Judicial Self-Limitation‟ Harvard Law Review (1924) (37) 338 -364 p 341. See 
also P Hunt „Reclaiming Social Rights‟ (1996) Ashgate: Aldershot  (p 66). Hunt acknowledges that 
both legal and non-legal processes are necessary to achieve fuller implementation of human rights;  P 
Farmer „Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor‟  (2003) 
University of California Press: Berkeley, on the contribution of legal processes to the implementation 
of human rights generally and how alternative strategies for realisation are often needed. 
5
 I Muvingi. „Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies‟ The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice (2009) 3 163-182 p 163 
6
 L Waldorf  „Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-economic Wrongs‟ Social and 
Legal Studies (2012) (21) 171 - 186,  p 173. Waldorf  analyses the difficulties and limitations 
associated with addressing socio-economic rights violations, albeit in respect of transitional justice: 
(„Socio-economic factors were mostly relegated to..historical background, where they could be more 
easily ignored.‟   p. 176 ) 
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1. Introduction  
„[n]either morality nor justice… requires considerable sacrifices  of some 
persons for the sake of trifling gains to others,  even if the ideal of equality 
may  seem initially to point in that direction.‟ 7 
 
In the absence of meaningful definitional standards, many socio-economic rights 
essentially become fictive: as Harris has observed, „consistent with the rule of law, 
the determinative factor in judicial review should be whether an applicant has 
established enforceable legal rights.‟ 8 By the same token, to be meaningfully 
juridical, human rights must at least be „subject to the scrutiny of a court of law or 
another judicial or quasi-judicial process.‟9  Whilst it is now generally accepted that 
most, if not all, socio-economic rights are essentially justiciable
10
 (at least in the 
sense of having some chance of being successfully litigated at the level of domestic 
courts and tribunals) it can also be argued that many such rights still tend to become 
particularly „flimsy‟ at particular points in their implementation and subsequent 
monitoring stages.
 11
  As Hoffman LJ observed,  
„Human rights include the right to a minimum standard of living, without 
which many of the other rights would be a mockery. But they certainly 
do not include the right to a fair distribution of resources or fair 
treatment in economic terms – in other words, distributive justice. Of 
                                                 
7
 E Rakowski „Equal Justice‟ (1993) Clarendon Press: London, p 2 
8
 Harris op cit n 1 p 632.  
9
 K Arambulo „Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Theoretical and Procedural Aspects‟ (1999) Hart, Oxford, p 55. This is traditionally 
viewed in the context of individual litigation through domestic courts or via individual complaint 
mechanisms. See also M Sepulveda „The Nature of the obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟  School of Human Rights Research Series 18 (2003) 
Intersentia, Antwerp, on how  the work of quasi-judicial organisations (such as the UN Treaty 
monitoring bodies) can  also be taken as evidence of  justiciability.   
10
 See further A Nolan „Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Non-state Actors 
through the Role of the State: A Comparison of Regional Approaches to the „Obligation to Protect‟ 
Human Rights Law Review (2009) 9 (2) 225-255; See however P O‟Connell „The Death of Socio-
economic Rights‟ Modern Law Review (2011) (74) 532–554 on how courts in Canada, India, and 
South Africa have moved away from protecting socio-economic rights in favour of tacitly endorsing 
the „neo-liberal policy prescriptions‟ of legislators.  
11
 See further J. Donnelly, „The Relative Universality of Human Rights‟ Human Rights Quarterly 
2(2007) 29 (2) 81;  G. Itzcovich, „One, None and One hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: 
The Lautsi Case‟ Human Rights Law Review (2013) 13(2) 287-308 
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course distributive justice is a good thing but it is not a fundamental 
right.‟ 12 
 
Domestic enforcement can thus be quite „frustrating‟13 for rights advocates, not 
least when it comes to identifying some form of useful minimum standards or 
rights-thresholds. With entitlements to social security or welfare benefits having 
been recognized however as a juridical form of property right, national courts are 
clearly obliged to protect vulnerable „rights beneficiaries‟ who may be at risk of 
suffering harm. While judges cannot force domestic decision-makers to act 
equitably, they can at least identify and, if needs must, condemn clear instances 
of inequity and degradation as they arise, or seem likely to occur. Repeatedly 
reminding those who hold the public purse-strings of their moral duty to actively 
protect basic levels of subsistence, might eventually enable some level of budget 
„ring-fencing,‟ aimed specifically at preventing violations of human dignity. 
Where law-making boundaries clearly exist however between the judiciary and 
the executive, it may be argued that calls for judicial oversight run the risk of 
falling prey to „judicial self-limitation‟ with some jurists‟ desire for change 
perhaps being too easily stymied by some „fear of the consequences that might 
ensue if courts were to interfere in such matters.‟ 14  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2003] UKHL 4 per Hoffman LJ at para 26 
13
 T Collingsworth „The Key Human Rights Challenge:  Developing Enforcement Mechanisms‟ 
Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002) 15 183, p185 
14
 Finkelstein op cit n 4 p 341; see also J H Jackson „Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A 
Policy Analysis‟ The American Journal of International Law (1992) (86) 310;  and J Jowell „Judicial 
Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity‟ (2003) Public Law 592  on how UK courts 
have adopted this approach (p 593) 
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2. Judicial (over)deference or judges as ‘rights-trustees’? 
 „Providing that the court limits itself to an investigation of the legal 
issues raised, there is no constitutional impropriety in such review. To 
the contrary, it is precisely the proper role of the court.‟15 
 
Factors which might also affect rights-enforcement at the level of domestic law and 
policy-making include socio-political resistance to international monitoring 
mechanisms, as occurred in the UK recently over the UN‟s criticism of its „bedroom 
tax‟ welfare reforms.16  Similarly, if certain types of rights are found to exist only 
where they have firstly been clearly defined in enshrining domestic statutes, or 
judicially endorsed via case law, and underpinned by adequately earmarked state 
resources, then this clearly calls into question the nature of such „rights.‟ Arguably, 
they may be better framed as state-sanctioned social privileges, especially given that 
access to such entitlements may be almost entirely dependent upon favourable social 
contexts: a legacy of political conflict or financial recession may easily serve to 
freeze or reverse progressive implementation or hinder intended impacts. Basic 
principles of non-discrimination and equality (of treatment, or of opportunity) may 
fall short where there is a need for fairness-led, equitable outcomes, not least in cases 
involving resource-dependent decision-making.
17
 Again, the ideals and language of 
                                                 
15
 C Finn „The Justiciability of Administrative Decisions: A Redundant Concept?‟ Fed L Rev (2002) 
(30)  239  on the proper role of the courts, the need for judicial review, the abuse of political power as 
an „exercise in bad faith or for improper purposes with no possibility of legal remedy‟ and how this „is 
contrary to the rule of law, and should not be countenanced without compelling reason.‟ (available 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/FedLRev/2002/9.html  accessed 01.02.15)  
16
 See for example R Rolnik  „The Promotion And Protection Of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Development: Report Of The Special 
Rapporteur On Adequate Housing As A Component Of The Right To An Adequate Standard Of Living, 
And On The Right To Non-Discrimination In This Context‟ (Distr. GENERAL A/HRC/10/7 4 
February 2009); and   http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/11/bedroom-tax-should-be-axed-
says-un-investigator . (accessed 31.01.15) Responses were fairly predictable: See for example 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/feb/03/ministers-savage-un-report-abolition-bedroom-tax  
(accessed 30.01.15)  
17See further D Turk „The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final Report by the 
Special Raporteur‟ (1992)   UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/16; M Craven „The International 
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„equity‟ (e.g. „trusteeship‟, fairness, justice, fiduciary obligations towards vulnerable 
beneficiaries) might prove useful in overcoming some of the difficulties that tend to 
attach to the implementation of such economically fragile rights. There seems to be 
increasing judicial reluctance however to comment upon the unfairness of certain 
resource allocations, highlight systemic welfare failings, or denounce the harshness 
of fiscal policies. Arguably, if judges were framed as the moral „trustees‟ of the 
fragile, dignity-based rights of the vulnerable, then perhaps legislators might be 
encouraged to allocate sufficient resources to protect such fundamental rights.  
 
Courts would not be usurping elected legislators in their role as budget 
administrators; rather they would be calling upon them to be mindful of their 
„fiduciary duty‟ to equitably care-take scarce public funds, without harming those 
social beneficiaries most in need of protection. Arguably, such an approach might 
enable a useful measure of rights „ring-fencing‟ on the basis that it must be possible 
to identify a point at which basic standards of human dignity have been allowed to 
fall below an acceptable rights-threshold. Ensuring that such situations are rectified 
as a matter of urgency, rather than political expediency, is a key task. Democratically 
mandated „austerity measures‟ might otherwise remain forever problematic; 
decisions which appear overtly discriminatory might well be challenged in court, but 
ultimately deemed rights-compliant on the basis that they were made both lawfully 
and rationally, and are therefore entirely „justified‟ in political or economic terms. 
This is especially so where the „greater good‟ has traditionally tended to demand 
                                                                                                                                          
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective On Its Development (1995) 
Clarendon Press: Oxford;  M Cranston  „What are Human Rights?‟  (1973) Bodley Head: London; C 
Orwin and T Pangle „The Philosophical Foundations Of Human Rights‟ in M Platter „Human rights in 
our time – Essays in memory of  Victor Baras‟ (1984) Westview Press, London; E Vierdag „The 
Nature Of The Rights Granted By The International  Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights‟ Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1978) (9) 69  
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preservation of scarce public funds by rationing allocations on the basis of most 
urgent need. Similarly, if domestic law and policy-makers have demonstrated 
sufficiently high levels of „due regard‟ for the rights of those likely to be adversely 
affected (via, say, political debate or public consultation) then this too might „court-
proof‟ many  controversial policy decisions which might otherwise have been framed 
as sorely testing the limits of rights compliance.
18
    
 
Domestic courts dealing with such contentious issues as social security payments, 
health care or adequate housing, remain well placed however to make significant 
contributions to human rights jurisprudence, irrespective of whether these matters are 
viewed as value-based, moral dilemmas or  as grounded in clear legal entitlements.
19
 
As Farmer has observed,  
„…human rights discussions are excessively legal and theoretical in 
focus.  They seek to define rights, mandate punishment by appropriate 
authorities for the violators, enforce international treaties, and so on.‟ 20  
 
Given that signatory states must view all individuals as „equal in human dignity‟21 
some meaningfully workable degree of government accountability should arise 
where this basic rights principle has been side-lined. 
22
 Focusing on the presence or 
                                                 
18
 See further A P Le Sueur „Justifying Judicial Caution: Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Policy‟ in B 
Hadfield (ed) „Judicial Review: A Thematic Approach‟ (1995) Gill and Macmillan: Dublin,p 240 
19
 See however Nolan A, O‟Connell R, and Harvey C (eds.) „Human Rights and Public Finance: 
Budgets and the Promotion of Economic and Social Rights‟ (2013) Hart, London, on how elected 
legislators (and public administrations) „have the primary responsibility, and the greatest capacity, for 
giving effect to such rights.‟ (p.1)  
20
 Farmer op cit n 4, p19. Farmer also cites L Henkin „The International Bill of Rights‟ (1981) 
Columbia University Press; New York, on how remedies in international law are similarly limited. 
See also T Collingsworth „The Key Human Rights Challenge:  Developing Enforcement Mechanisms‟ 
Harvard Human Rights Journal (2002) (15) 183 who suggests that remedies must lie in domestic law. 
21
 See the Preambles to the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR for example.  
22See The UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147 „Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to 
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law‟ (16 December 2005)  A/RES/60/147.  
Although no article within The ICESCR establishes such a right, General Comment No. 14  „The 
Right To The Highest Attainable Standard Of Health (Article 12)‟  E/C.12/2000/4  para 59  states that 
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absence of domestic legal remedies should allow for some discussion of „what it 
actually takes to enable people to be secure against the standard, predictable threats 
to their rights.‟23 Non-discrimination at least provides a useful starting point: as 
Freeman pointed out, basic principles of „natural justice‟ might be invoked even 
where no other obvious norms or legal rules are evident.
24
 The procedural or 
administrative aspects of a claim may allow for some useful level of judicial 
oversight even if the core grievances of a plaintiff cannot be litigated.
25
 As Toebes 
argued in respect of the Netherlands, „justiciability does not always refer to rights as 
such but, rather to elements‟26 within those rights.  Litigating significant aspects of 
the right to health care (rather than searching for some workably specific domestic 
definition of a right to health) can serve to create significant precedent. 
27
 As 
McLean has further stressed, „even where rights are not formally provided for in 
constitutions, where a remedy is provided it can reasonably be concluded that the 
right is taken to exist.‟28  On this point Toebbes conceded however that 
                                                                                                                                          
„any person or group victim of a violation of the right to health should have access to effective judicial 
or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels.‟ 
23
 H Shue „Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy‟ (1996) Princeton University 
Press; Princeton, p160 
24
 M D A Freeman Lloyd‟s Introduction to Jurisprudence (2001) Sweet and Maxwell, London, p1379 
on the principle of natural justice (as applied in cases such as National Bank of Greece and Athens  v 
Metliss [1958] AC 509; see para 525, per Viscount Simonds) 
25
 See also C McCrudden „ A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations 
on Constitutional Rights‟ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2000) (4) 499 on how judges may „refer 
extensively to  the decisions of foreign courts when interpreting human rights guarantees.‟    
26
 B Toebes  „The Right To Health As A Human Right In International Law‟  (1999) Intersentia 
Publishers, Oxford,  p168 
27
 See for example Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (CCT32/97) [1997] ZACC 17; 
1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (27 November 1997).  See  also D  Bilchitz  „Placing 
Basic Needs at the Center of Socio Economic Rights Jurisprudence‟ ESR Review (2002)  (4) 1 on how  
the  approach may be administrative  rather than substantive;  See also R v Cambridgeshire Health 
Authority ex p. B [1995] 1 WLR 898 and Rodgers v Swindon Primary Health Care Trust and the 
Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWCA Civ 392  as examples of  judicial  reviews taken in 
relation to Health Authority decisions to not provide particular  medicines. See further M A McTeer 
„A Role for  Law in Matters of Morality‟ Mc Gill Law Journal  (1995) (40) 893; A C Elias- Jones and 
J Samanta „The Implications of the David Glass Case for Future Clinical Practice in the UK‟ Arch Dis 
Chil (2005) (90)  822 p 823 argue that until a better system exists (based perhaps on medical ethics 
committees) the courts are likely to remain as the „arbiters of the child‟s best interests‟ in such 
contexts. 
28
 S McLean „A UK Perspective in Health Care Restraints‟  in A. den Exter and  H. Hermans (eds) 
„The Right to Health Care in Several European Countries:  Expert meeting, held in Rotterdam, the 
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„In spite of the fact that the Dutch courts are said to have paid 
considerable attention to economic and social rights, there are very few 
judgements in which the Dutch courts have granted direct effect to 
economic, social and cultural rights.‟ 29 
 
That said, as a basic starting point „the equality principle is a dominant and recurring 
theme of international human rights law.‟30 National equality laws have in turn 
essentially been „legitimated on the grounds that they further the liberal goals of 
State neutrality, individualism and the promotion of autonomy‟.31 The notions of 
equality of opportunity and equal treatment in theory should provide considerable 
scope for enabling a greater indivisibility of rights,
32
 and creating an underpinning 
philosophy of allocating scarce resources in the most equitable way possible.
 33
 
Historical and socio-political context clearly also matters: the South African 
Constitution for example admitted that a fresh focus on non-discrimination was 
unlikely to correct entrenched inequalities which had resulted from decades of unfair 
laws and policies.  As its Preamble states, „the People of South Africa recognize the 
injustices of the past,‟ whilst Article 1(a) underscores the importance of „human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.‟ 34 Legally embedding equality principles could prevent blatantly unlawful 
                                                                                                                                          
Netherlands.  April 27 –28 1998‟ (1999) Kluwer law International; The Hague, who suggests that a 
legal right truly exists only where an actual legal remedy is present (p 59) 
29
 Toebes op cit n 26. Toebes differentiates between direct effect and the „internal effect‟ of Treaties 
via domestic law. 
30
 A Bayefsky „The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law‟ Human Rights 
Quarterly (1990) (11) 1, p 2. See also C McCrudden (ed)  „Anti- Discrimination Law: The 
International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, Second Series‟  (2003) Dartmouth 
Publishing Company; Aldershot p xiii  on how the grounds of discrimination have expanded and how 
new concepts of  equality have developed; S C Kolm „Justice and Equity‟ (2002) MIT Press; 
Massachusetts, on how „justice, fairness, or equity‟ can underpin global „codes‟ of justice.  
31
  S Fredman „Equality: A New Generation‟  Industrial Law Journal (June, 2001) (30) 145 p 154  
32
 Turk op cit n 17   
33
  See for example the CESCR Committee‟s „Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Algeria (28/12/1995)  UN Document E/C.12/1995/17 which 
cited deep concern over „the fact that the philosophy of the Covenant, based on the principle of non-
discrimination and on the idea of the universality of human rights, has not fully taken root.‟ (at para 
16)  
34
 See The South African Constitution available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm (accessed 10.10.14)  
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forms of discrimination, removing any „arbitrary, invidious or unjustified distinction 
or differentiation unwarranted by those made subject to them.‟35 Preventing indirect 
discrimination, especially as it relates to accessing or using essential services, also 
has clear ties to the promotion of human dignity and to poverty avoidance,
36
  as 
Farmer‟s work on „structural violence‟37 made very plain.38 And yet, „equal treatment 
can perpetuate inequalities‟39 not least where decision-makers are free to cite an 
over-arching need to protect the „public good‟40 or promote a notion of higher „state 
necessity.‟41   
 
Ensuring a decent standard of living is not merely about achieving broad-brush social 
or economic equalities: if everyone is equally ill, impoverished, or living in a similar 
state of degrading squalor, then it can hardly be said that principles of equal 
treatment have served either to define (or ring-fence funds to protect) meaningful 
rights standards. The concept of „adequacy‟ might be more clearly articulated via 
equitable principles of justice or fairness: these in turn could point perhaps to some 
discernible minimum rights thresholds of provision, which might then be used to 
embed positive state obligations, or at least to highlight (or prevent a repeat of) abject 
failings of law and policy. Where however rights are repeatedly defined as being 
                                                 
35
 T McKean „Equality and Discrimination under International law‟ (1983) Clarendon Press; Oxford 
p185    
36
 See G Oppenheimer, R Bayer and J Colgrove „Health and Human Rights: Old wine in new bottles?‟ 
The Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics (2002) (30) 522 on Villerme‟s 19th century study on  
mortality and living conditions in France; Chadwick‟s report on English sanitary conditions and 
Virchow‟s study of the Prussian typhus epidemic.   
37
 P Farmer „Infections and Inequalities: The modern plagues‟   (2001) University of California Press; 
London; See also P Farmer „Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights And The New War On The 
Poor.  (2003) University of California Press: Berkeley. 
38
 See also however V Leary  „The Right To Health In International Human Rights Law‟ Health And 
Human Rights (1994) (1)  28  on how there may be no automatic link between resources and health 
status.  
39
 Fredman op cit n 31 p 2 
40
 B Lee „Judicial Review and Access to Health Care‟ in T Buck (ed) „Judicial Review And Social 
Welfare: Citizenship And Law Series‟ (1998)  Pinter; London, p 40.   
41
 See further  A T Price -Smith „The Health Of Nations:  Infectious Disease, Environmental Change 
And Their Effects On National Security And Development‟  (2001) MIT Press: Massachusetts, p10 
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dependent upon a state‟s „maximum available resources‟ (or couched in the language 
of progressive aspiration) domestic jurists are perhaps left with few options. They 
must either frame inadequate domestic legal frameworks as being essentially 
compliant with human rights obligations, or quietly classify them as inevitable 
contraventions, justified on the basis that decision-makers (i.e. budget holders) must 
protect the „greater good.‟ In other words, national laws or policies on funding 
allocations which engage socio-economic rights may be profoundly unfair in terms 
of individual impacts and compromises to human dignity, but will remain essentially 
justifiable on the basis that public funds must be directed towards other, higher-
priority rights issues. Judges face a difficult task in attempting to overturn decisions 
arising from such reasoning. And yet it can be argued that, 
„The greater the legal content of any issue, the greater the potential role 
of the court, because under our constitution and subject to the sovereign 
power of Parliament it is the function of the courts and not of political 
bodies to resolve legal questions.‟42 
 
In doing so, domestic courts can surely look to the various „ethical concept[s], 
grounded in principles of distributive justice.‟43  As Whitehead and Dahlgren argued, 
„health inequality‟ is not completely removed from „health inequity‟ given how both 
concepts have the potential to create „systematic, socially produced (and therefore 
modifiable) and unfair‟ outcomes.44  The two concepts can still however be 
differentiated: health inequalities may arise from justified instances of discrimination 
(for example, an unavoidable targeting of resources during times of disaster, war or 
                                                 
42
 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at 
para 29 
43
 P Braveman and S Gruskin „Theory and Methods  Defining  Equity in Health‟  Journal of  
Epidemiology and Community Health (2003) (57)  254 
44
 See M Whitehead and G Dahlgren „Levelling Up ( Part 1):  A Discussion Paper on Concepts and 
Principles for tackling Social Inequities in Health‟ ( 2006) WHO Collaborating Centre for Policy 
Research on Social Determinants of Health, University of  Liverpool; M Whitehead and G Dahlgren 
„Levelling Up (Part 2):  A Discussion Paper on European Strategies for tackling Social Inequities in 
Health‟ (2006) WHO Collaborating Centre for Policy Research on Social Determinants of Health, 
University of Liverpool  
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political transition) while health inequities might be more easily challenged on the 
basis that unnecessarily harsh, unfair decisions have been made. 
45
 Domestic law and 
policy-makers seem however to prefer the more clearly defined parameters of 
equality principles on the basis that these  
 
„can be assessed with respect to specified measurable outcomes, whereas 
judging whether a process is equitable or
 
not is more open to 
interpretation.‟46   
 
In respect of defining „health justice,‟ two approaches to equitable fairness (direct 
and indirect) seem possible. 
47
 The direct approach could simply see „equity as an 
end in itself‟ and perhaps involve a meaningful nod to distributive justice: an indirect 
approach could however be aimed instead at having „equity embedded within the 
concept of social justice‟ which might encourage greater judicial scrutiny of the 
various underlying processes which permit (and at times seem to endorse) 
inequalities.
 48
  The idea of inherent human dignity remains relevant, despite its often 
subjective nature. 
49
 Used objectively however, human dignity can reveal underlying 
policy „attitudes to an individual or group…[and] social norms or expectations.‟50 As 
Feldman has further argued, a focus upon 
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„“the inherent dignity of the human person” as a foundation for rights is 
different from conferring a right to dignity…on the other hand, one 
clearly has an interest in having one‟s human dignity respected, and this 
may support more specific rights.‟51 
 
Arguably, a truly juridical, enshrined right to avoid indignity, underpinned by such 
key equitable principles as fairness, may make it more difficult for budget-holders to 
simply dismiss or explain incidents of poverty, squalor and avoidable ill-health as 
inevitable, austerity-led events. 
 
3. Identifying baseline rights thresholds: equality or equity?  
„The “very simple tripartite typology of duties” …was not supposed to become a new 
frozen abstraction to occupy the same rigid conceptual space previously held by 
“negative rights” and “positive rights”… The constructive point was: look at what it 
actually takes to enable people to be secure against the standard, predictable threats to 
their rights.‟ 52 
 
The task of differentiating between rights-bearing legal issues and socio-political 
complaints over resource-allocations often falls to domestic judges; they must then 
decide whether the matter in question is one of fundamental principle (involving 
moral rights or legal notions of justice) or one of higher state policy, requiring 
utilitarian calculations on the use of finite resources, and the nature of the „public 
good‟.53  As Allan suggested, 
„when the modern welfare–regulatory state confers extensive 
discretionary powers on public agencies, enabling them to perform wide-
ranging and perhaps loosely defined public functions, the clear cut 
distinction between law and administration, or law and public policy, 
dissolves.‟54   
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Although individuals cannot require (or reasonably expect) domestic courts to 
overturn allocations of scarce or finite resources, or to create social welfare 
entitlements where none have previously existed in national law, certain state actions 
on „distributive justice‟ can at least be subject to some manner of judicial overview, 
not least in relation to preventing instances of overt bias or discrimination. As King 
has argued, judicial deference should not necessarily preclude judicial intervention, 
particularly where fundamental human rights protections are at stake.
55
  In respect of 
the United Kingdom, domestic courts have, post-Human Rights Act, „gone much 
further in reviewing resource allocation decisions on human rights grounds than 
under administrative law.‟56 The question for human rights advocates is perhaps not 
whether domestic courts should discuss resource distribution but one of gauging 
when exactly judicial intervention or critique will actually be precluded by domestic 
law.
57
 Arguably, court decisions on the use of scarce resources could be viewed 
either as examples of „discretionary allocative decision making‟ 58 (long regarded as 
an area where judges ought „not to trespass‟59) or as providing useful guidance which 
may eventually translate into „allocative impact.‟ 60 If some „legitimate expectation‟ 
or target-based duties are identified then judicial involvement seems entirely 
legitimate.
61
  Where an inability to access resources directly impacts upon the ability 
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to subsist,
62
 domestic litigation becomes less about examining the remit of certain 
rights, and much more aligned with the less easily ignored concepts of welfare, 
charity and „powerlessness.‟  As Frankovits has argued, 
„Policies and programs which rest primarily on a perception of need and 
powerlessness subtly reinforce the powerlessness of the recipients who 
are seen as being given justice rather than as receiving their rights. The 
recognition of entitlement is in itself an act of empowerment.‟  63  
 
 
Where individual entitlements arise by virtue of innate humanity, they should have 
the potential to withstand changes of government and to address at least some of the 
problems associated with resource scarcity. Where there is a clear distinction 
between actual, available levels of resources and those which should be made 
available under principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
64
 it may be argued 
that some sort of „minimum rights threshold‟ (rather than a domestically defined, 
economic austerity-led benchmarking) is needed. This could serve as a „practical 
minimal floor of well-being as a standard for distributive analysis.‟ 65 Alston‟s view 
of the Millennium Development Goals as targets to be achieved („ceiling‟) rather 
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than basic levels below which standards should not fall („floor‟) 66 seems particularly 
apt: domestic judgments perhaps represent the best opportunity for identifying – if 
not actually raising – those rights-benchmarks which have failed to ring-fence funds 
to enable meaningful standards of living, or embed a culture of human dignity 
rights.
67
 As the World Health Organisation („WHO‟) has made very plain: „[t]here is 
a health baseline below which no individual in any country should find 
themselves.‟68 A clear danger with having rights-vague minimum thresholds is that 
frequently „the floor will become the ceiling.‟69 As Chapman has further argued, 
there is a clear need to focus upon the actual content of such rights, and to assess 
how these might be tied to core state obligations which might then be cited as 
underpinning, legal duties.
70
 If domestic courts are unable to frame certain rights as 
fully juridical (on the basis of too-scarce resources for example) then they might at 
least be able to provide some useful level of guidance on where equitable baseline 
standards might be found to exist.  
 
The notion of fairness ought not to be tied to resource allocations but to rights-
impact: where state decisions have served to strip individuals of dignity, then either 
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no clearly discernible rights baseline exists or it has been effectively disregarded by 
law and policy-makers.  If „the extent of policy freedom inherent to progressive 
realisation‟ affords domestic decision-makers considerable scope in relation to 
pleading a scarcity of resources,
71
 then gauging whether a juridical human rights 
violation has occurred requires a fairly substantive analysis of state conduct. Failure 
to recognise that key decisions on resource allocations tend to impact most 
profoundly upon the vulnerable, can easily create structurally embedded forms of 
poverty, homelessness and chronic ill-health.
72
 A „rescue approach‟ to situations 
which have arisen directly from inequitable policy decisions does not seem 
particularly inappropriate, 
73
 especially if decision-makers are framed as the 
„trustees‟ of scarce resources, tasked with safeguarding the basic rights of those who 
would be most affected by any down-shifting of baseline standards.
74
 Difficulties in 
implementation remain likely, given how „inequalities combine, interact, and are 
reproduced through interlinked economic, political, and socio-cultural processes.‟75 
There is therefore a need for states to more clearly identify and target the intended 
„beneficiaries‟ of finite resources on the basis of equitable distributions rather than 
via blunt equality of treatment. As Le Franc et al have noted, making judgements 
upon the basis of equality of opportunity remains a complex process requiring a 
complex formula including:   
                                                 
71
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„…circumstances, which consist of the determinants that should not lead, 
other things equal, to differences in outcome; luck, which comprises the 
determinants that are seen as a fair source of inequality provided that 
they are even-handed, with respect to circumstances.
76
 
 
McCrudden has also stressed the importance of „preventing status harm,‟77 with its 
focus on actively requiring public authorities to be aware of the fundamental needs of 
those groups that clearly experience inequality and then actively work towards 
remedying shortcomings. Thus domestic equality laws and wider international law 
principles may amount to „an adjunct to the protection of particularly prized public 
goods‟ 78 focussing perhaps upon a fiduciary duty of just „distribution …rather than 
on the characteristics of the recipient‟.79 As Farmer has further suggested in respect 
of the right to health, „any distinguishing characteristic, whether social or biological 
can serve as a pretext for discrimination and thus as a cause of suffering.‟80  
Inequalities in the context of health rights have been documented in relation to issues 
of gender, race, religion, age and socio-economic status.
81
 Although socio-economic 
status is not one of the traditional comparators within health law, its relevance has 
been flagged up via international law‟s focus on the concept of vulnerable groups.  
As Braveman and Gruskin also point out, „social justice or fairness …is an ethical 
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concept,
 grounded in principles of distributive justice.‟82  There are a number of extra 
difficulties attaching to the „operationalisation‟ of a „health equity‟ agenda (as 
opposed to a basic equality of opportunity rights template) in this context, especially 
where social disadvantage was a pre-existing or immutable factor. If health is 
regarded more as a „social advantage‟ then a „right‟ to health may be better defined 
or described in fairly „relative terms.‟83 Arguably, equitable notions could be used 
here to at least underscore the importance of such key concepts as human dignity. 
That said, relying on “the inherent dignity of the human person” as a foundation for 
embedding fragile rights is different from finding „a right to dignity…‟84  despite the 
fact „dignity is often linked to autonomy or the freedom of the individual.‟85 Where 
social inequalities are perhaps inevitable (on the basis of perpetually scarce 
resources, for example) then legally justifiable forms of discrimination may arise as 
unavoidable outcomes.  
 
As Fabre has observed, issues of economic, social and cultural rights seem to 
represent a sort of crossroads for the concepts of democracy and distributive 
justice.
86
 Particularly during times of economic crisis, it may well be the case that 
„people oppose constitutional social rights on the grounds that they give unacceptable 
powers of interference to the judiciary.‟87 And yet judicial enforcement remains 
central to the embedding of human rights as meaningful concepts in domestic law. 
As McKeever and Ní Aoláin have further argued, there are two main models of 
judicial enforcement in respect of economic, social and cultural rights: a minimum 
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level of enforcement related only to procedural aspects and the more substantive 
mode of enforcement reflecting a clearly „constitutionalised‟ right. 88 The substantive 
enforcement model would seek to „define and enforce a set of social and economic 
rights protections‟ whose „entrenchment can be achieved either by constitutional or 
legislative means.‟89 They also suggest a third model which would not be utterly 
dependent upon judicial enforcement however and which would look also to the 
„mainstreaming‟ of human rights provisions, for example national Human Rights 
Commissions or the use of equality impact assessments. In this sense „mainstreaming 
means that equality is not just an add-on or after thought but is a factor taken into 
account in every decision and policy.‟ 90  However, because basic „procedural justice 
does not require any particular outcome,‟91 non-discrimination remains significant to 
the equality rights template; even in the wake of the Thlimmenos v Greece decision, 
there is little guidance on how to provide rights protection for those who are different 
in terms of requiring equity of outcome rather than equality of allocation, opportunity 
or treatment.
92
  As Burnip confirmed, there is clearly a state obligation to actively 
„make provision to cater for the significant difference.‟93 Such a substantive 
approach to the issue of specific entitlements might require domestic jurists to at 
least consider questions of distributive justice.  
                                                 
88
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4. Conclusion 
Where public funds are involved, certain rights issues may be seen as beyond the 
remit of domestic judiciaries. In times of economic austerity, this may create a sort of 
amnesty for „widespread ignorance of the ICESCR not only among judges but also 
among governments and the community.‟94 Given however the vast amount of legal 
and political discourse generated by the various human rights bodies and by domestic 
litigation, it is clear that „we will not be able to say in hindsight, “if only we had 
known.”‟ 95 If the task of protecting resource-dependent, fragile socio-economic 
rights is to be almost always left exclusively to elected politicians rather than shared 
with the courts, then this perhaps also challenges the concept of rights-
indivisibility.
96  
Similarly, where the most fundamental socio-economic rights are 
entirely dependent upon adequate resources being made available, it may be more 
appropriate to refer to them as mere parcels of privilege, easily prone to being set 
aside or to suffering open-ended implementation delays. As such, they may still be 
described as dishearteningly „opaque‟97 concepts in terms of their scope and content. 
That said, some measure of increased coherence is gradually emerging, especially 
where the various UN Committees have continued to stress their disquiet over the 
lack of embedding and meaningful monitoring at domestic level. The key to 
protecting such rights in domestic law, it seems, is via consistent, close scrutiny 
(judicial or otherwise) of relevant domestic laws, policies, customs and impacts.
98
 
Unfortunately, if domestic jurists seem at times to be „less than involved in the 
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pursuit of the attainment of economic, social and cultural rights‟99 then these rights 
are unlikely to crystallize into a legally enforceable kind of entitlement any time 
soon. As such, the concept of domestic non-justiciability can be used to both 
categorise and gauge the limitations of human rights law. Requiring domestic 
decision-makers to focus particularly upon such basic concepts as human dignity, 
fairness, and equitable outcomes, could yet provide a means of overcoming at least 
some of the barriers that tend to arise during times of financial austerity.
100
 Policy 
reforms and budgetary decisions which result in profound human rights 
infringements should not simply be dismissed as an inevitable consequence of 
economic downturn. Domestic lawyers and elected legislators must seek to identify 
and promote clear baseline rights-thresholds, below which human dignity ceases to 
be evident, and human degradation perhaps becomes near-normative.  Arguably, 
with public purse-strings being increasingly tightened on the basis of targeting finite 
resources at those most „deserving‟ of help, it may be argued that human rights 
protections during times of austerity have much more in common with charitable 
dispositions than they do with automatic, inherent entitlements. Depressing though 
this thought may be, it does at least provide some basis for the argument that elected 
law-makers have been politically mandated to act as „rights settlors.‟ This obliges 
them to not only clearly define socio-economic rights (by setting clearly articulated, 
dignity-based minimum standards and thresholds) but to allocate equitable levels of 
                                                 
99
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resources, which must then be ring-fenced as budget priorities. 
101
 The courts could 
in turn be framed as „trustees‟ of the rights in question, and tasked with determining 
whether or not just and equitable resource allocations have been made.  For them to 
do otherwise (through fear of overstepping their remit, or „puncturing‟ margins of 
appreciation) is clearly a derogation of their responsibilities to protect the most 
vulnerable of „rights beneficiaries.‟ The state‟s continuing „fairness agenda‟ of socio-
economic rights austerity, seems set at times on almost mirroring traditional civil or 
political atrocities, in terms of embedding widespread hunger, poverty, 
homelessness, and degradingly inadequate health care provision. Domestic judges 
must not permit a traditional deference towards Parliament to enable and perpetuate 
socio-economic injustices: to do so is to tacitly endorse not only domestic level 
erosion of human rights law, but the gradual forfeiture of human dignity thresholds.  
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